What Is Privileged Access Management? How PAM Works and Where to Start
Privileged access management (PAM) means controlling who holds admin rights, when they can use them, and what gets recorded.
Table of Contents
PAM is one part of identity and access management, and it covers the accounts attackers want most. The first steps don't need a new license: fewer admins, separate admin logins, and a unique local admin password on every PC. A password vault and Microsoft's just-in-time admin tool (PIM) come later, once someone can list exactly which accounts hold admin rights.
On March 11, 2026, somebody wiped nearly 80,000 of Stryker's devices in about three hours without ransomware or any malware. According to BleepingComputer's reporting on the attack, the intruder compromised an administrator account, created a brand-new Global Administrator, and used Microsoft Intune, Stryker's own device management tool, to send the wipe command.
Every company has a few accounts like that. Listing them usually takes an afternoon and a couple of admin portals, even for the person who manages your IT. In practice, privileged access management is finding those accounts, cutting the count, and putting an approval step and a record in front of each one.

Key Takeaways: A privileged account is defined by its permissions, not a job title. PAM rests on four controls: least privilege, just-in-time access, credential vaulting, and approval with session records. The free steps come first, including under 5 Global Admins, separate admin logins, Windows LAPS, and phishing-resistant MFA. PIM needs Entra ID P2 at $10 a month for each admin who uses it, and Business Premium doesn't include it. Buy a vault when shared passwords need rotation you can prove.
Which Accounts Count as Privileged?
NIST defines a privileged account as a system account with the authorizations of a privileged user. In practice that's any login that can change settings, create users, read everyone's data, or turn security controls off. Permissions decide it, not job titles, and in a typical Microsoft-based company the list runs well past the obvious two or three admins.
- The Microsoft 365 Global Administrator. Microsoft's own guidance notes that whoever signs up for the service gets this role by default, so your first admin might be a founder, a former employee, or the consultant who set things up.
- Domain admins in Active Directory, the user directory on a local Windows server, if one still runs in a closet somewhere.
- The local administrator account on every Windows PC. If all 150 machines share one password, one stolen password opens all 150.
- Service accounts, which are logins that software uses to talk to other software, like a backup job or an ERP connector.
- Admin roles inside business apps such as the ERP, the accounting system, and payroll.
- Your IT provider's technician accounts and remote management tools, one of the doors covered in our software supply chain security guide.
- Break-glass accounts, meant for emergencies only.
- Automation scripts and AI agents that act with admin rights on somebody's behalf.

Count yours and write the number down.
How Does PAM Work?
PAM works through four controls. Keep admin rights to the minimum, grant them only for the task at hand, lock up and rotate the shared passwords, and require approval plus a record for high-impact actions. A few of them already ship inside Microsoft 365.
The first is least privilege, meaning every account gets only the permissions its job needs. Microsoft Entra ID, the sign-in system behind Microsoft 365, has more than 65 built-in roles for this, so the person who resets passwords doesn't need the role that can delete your Microsoft 365 tenant (the company's whole account with Microsoft).
The second is just-in-time access. An admin is eligible for a role, activates it for a set window when a task calls for it, and loses it when the window closes. In Microsoft's world that's Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM), which supports time-bound activation, approval, MFA at activation, a written reason, and access reviews. Standing admin rights are open around the clock. An attacker needs one hour.

The third is credential vaulting, which people often confuse with PIM. PIM switches a role on and off for a person's own account and never holds a password. A vault holds the actual credentials, like the shared firewall login or a service account password, lends them out under supervision, and changes them afterward. Delinea, Idira (Palo Alto Networks' new name for CyberArk), BeyondTrust, and Keeper all sell vaults, and we scored ten of them in our ranking of the best PAM solutions for 2026. Gartner's 2026 Magic Quadrant for PAM names BeyondTrust, Delinea, and Palo Alto Networks as Leaders. Windows LAPS does a narrow version of the same job for local admin accounts, at no charge.
The fourth is oversight. After Stryker, CISA urged organizations to require a second administrator's approval before sensitive or high-impact changes go through. Session recording also captures what an admin did while elevated, which matters when an auditor or an incident responder asks. Together, the four controls apply zero trust to your most dangerous logins.

Does the PAM vs IAM vs PIM Label Matter?
The labels matter less than the controls. IAM is the whole system for who gets access to what, and our explainer on how identity and access management fits together covers it end to end. PAM is the slice of IAM that handles admin-level accounts. PIM is Microsoft's tool for handing out whole admin roles just in time. If a proposal says PIM, ask what happens to the passwords PIM doesn't manage.
Why Do Attackers Go After Admin Accounts First?
One admin account turns a small break-in into a company-wide one. With admin rights, an attacker can create new accounts, switch off security tools, and push changes to every device, all through tools your IT team already trusts.
Stryker is the loud example. A quieter one is in a February 2024 CISA advisory: an attacker got into a state government network with the account of a former employee who'd held administrative privileges, using credentials that had likely leaked in an unrelated breach. Nobody had removed the account. Inside, the attacker found a second set of admin credentials stored on a SharePoint server, for a domain administrator with reach into both the on-premises directory and the cloud.

Help desks are another way in. CISA's advisory on Scattered Spider, updated in July 2025, describes the group posing as employees and talking IT help desk staff into resetting passwords and moving MFA to a device the attackers control. IBM's 2026 Cost of a Data Breach Report ranked help desk impersonation as the second most expensive way in, according to Help Net Security's coverage of the report. IBM's report put the average breach at $4.99 million, with 247 days to identify and contain one.
Microsoft's 2025 Digital Defense Report found that more than 97% of identity attacks are password attacks, and identity-based attacks rose 32% in the first half of 2025. An admin password is the one that pays best. Basic push-notification MFA helps, but it has its own weak spot in MFA push bombing, which is why CISA keeps asking for phishing-resistant MFA on admin accounts specifically. Ask your IT lead whether every admin account has it, and wait for a plain yes.
Does Your Business Actually Need a PAM Product?
Every company with admin accounts needs the practice. Not every company needs a PAM product. The dividing line is the number of admin accounts and shared credentials you have, and whether servers, plant systems, or auditors are in the picture.
A 25-person firm that runs entirely on Microsoft 365, with two admins and no local server, doesn't need to buy a vault. What it needs is two named admins with separate admin logins, phishing-resistant MFA on both, LAPS on every laptop, and a break-glass account nobody touches day to day.
A 150-person manufacturer is a different case. It might run an on-premises domain controller (the server behind Active Directory), an ERP server, and service accounts linking the two so orders and shop-floor schedules keep moving overnight. Those service account passwords are what to vault first: they're often shared, rarely changed, and production stops when they break.
A larger company changes the picture again. A dedicated IT team, admins spread across Microsoft 365, Azure, and a few Linux servers, and a customer asking for SOC 2 or CMMC evidence. Just-in-time elevation and recorded sessions stop being nice extras, because the evidence has to come from somewhere. Compliance readiness is its own engagement, separate from managed IT, but records of who held admin access, and when, are part of what an auditor asks to see.

What You Already Own Before You Buy Anything
A Microsoft 365 company already owns enough for the first round of PAM work: built-in Entra roles, alerts for too many Global Admins, Windows LAPS, security defaults, and separate admin accounts. None of that needs a new license. PIM is where the extra spend starts.
Open the Microsoft Entra admin center and count your Global Administrators. Five minutes, tops. Microsoft recommends fewer than 5, and fewer than 10 privileged role assignments overall. Hit 5 Global Admins and the overview page shows an alert card, while going past 10 privileged assignments puts a warning on the roles page. Those thresholds come straight from Microsoft's best practices for Entra roles, which also recommend 2 cloud-only emergency access accounts that permanently hold Global Administrator for the day nobody else can sign in. Cloud-only matters. An account synced from on-premises Active Directory can fall along with it.
Windows LAPS is free. It shipped in the April 11, 2023 Windows update, gives each device's local administrator account its own rotating password, and backs that password up to Microsoft Entra ID even on the Free tier. If every PC in your office still shares one local admin password, this is the cheapest fix in the whole post.

Separate admin accounts cost nothing but a little friction. CISA's Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 ask administrators to keep separate user accounts for anything unrelated to admin work, business email and web browsing included. An admin who opens a phishing link while signed in as admin has just handed over the admin account.
Microsoft's free security defaults also protect tenant admin accounts with MFA. It's a low bar. Check that it's on.
According to Microsoft's Entra licensing documentation, Microsoft 365 Business Premium includes Entra ID P1, and PIM requires Entra ID P2 or Entra ID Governance. Business Premium alone won't get you PIM. The scope is smaller than people expect, though. Microsoft's own licensing examples count the eligible admins and approvers who use PIM, not every employee, so 5 eligible admins means 5 licenses. Entra ID P2 lists at $10 per user per month on an annual commitment, and it's already included if you bought Microsoft's Defender Suite add-on for Business Premium.
Where Should You Start with PAM?
Start with an inventory, then cut. List every privileged account, including your IT provider's, remove what isn't needed, and protect what's left before you buy a tool. Steps one through five cost staff time, not licenses.
- Inventory every privileged account across Microsoft 365, Active Directory, business apps, and your IT provider's tools, and put an owner's name next to each one.
- Get Global Administrators under 5, the line where Microsoft's own alert card appears. User Administrator or Exchange Administrator covers most daily work.
- Give each admin a second login used only for admin tasks, as CISA's CPG 2.0 asks.
- Put phishing-resistant MFA (passkeys or FIDO2 security keys, not text codes) on every admin account.
- Turn on Windows LAPS. It's been in Windows since April 2023.
- If you have Entra ID P2, switch standing admin rights to just-in-time activation in PIM.
- Vault the shared passwords: the firewall login, service accounts, the ERP's built-in admin.
- Make remote wipes and bulk deletions wait for a second admin's approval, which is what CISA asked for after Stryker.
- Every quarter, review who holds admin access. When someone leaves, remove theirs that day.
Windows LAPS and security defaults are free, and the Global Admin alert card shows up in the Entra admin center at no extra cost. If you'd like help running the inventory, speak to an identity security expert.
Where PAM Projects Break
Tools rarely sink a PAM project. Unowned accounts do, along with emergency logins that drift into daily use, vaults bought while habits stay put, and access reviews that a busy IT team keeps pushing to next month.
Picture a service account created years ago to connect a scanner to the file server. Someone gave it domain admin because the narrower permission didn't work on the first try, set its password never to expire, wrote none of it down, and eventually left the company. The account stayed. Rotate that password without knowing what depends on it and something stops working at 6 a.m., which is exactly why nobody wants to touch it, and exactly why it's worth an attacker's time.
Break-glass accounts get borrowed. The emergency login always works, and a few months later it's somebody's daily driver. At that point it's just a Global Administrator with worse habits.
The vault is the sneaky one, bought while the habits around it stay put. Admins keep their standing rights for now, shared passwords get copied out of the vault into a notes file, and the audit report says PAM is deployed. Nobody's lying. The vault just isn't protecting anything.
Staffing is the last one, and it's the least glamorous. ISC2's 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study found that 95% of respondents' organizations have at least one cybersecurity skills need, and 59% call that shortfall critical or significant. Quarterly access reviews are precisely the recurring work that slides when a two-person IT team is buried in tickets. Nobody notices a skipped one. Somebody has to chase down the owner of the account nobody recognizes.